

**CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THIRTY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 14 May 1962, at 10 a.m.

Chairman:

Mr. BURNS

(Canada)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.A. de MELLO-FRANCO

Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS

Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE

Miss M. GOES

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV

Mr. N. MINTCHEV

Mr. G. GUELEV

Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

Mr. J. BARRINGTON

U Tin MAUNG

Canada:

Mr. E.E.M. BURNS

Mr. J.E.G. HARDY

Mr. J.F.M. BELL

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. J. HAJEK

Mr. M. ZEMLA

Mr. E. PEPICH

Mr. J. BUCEK

Ethiopia:

Mr. P. SAHLOU

Mr. M. HAMID

Mr. A. MANDEPRO

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL

Mr. A.S. MEHTA

Mr. K.K. RAO

Mr. C.K. GAIROLA

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI
Mr. C. COSTA-RIGHINI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE

Nigeria:

Mr. A.A. ATTA
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZOWSKI
Mr. M. BLUSZTAJN
Mr. M. BIEN
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. G. MACOVESCU
Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. C. SANDRU
Mr. E. GLASER

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. G.A. WESTRING
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN
Mr. H. BLIK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.A. ZORIN
Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN
Mr. I.G. USACHEV
Mr. V.N. ZHEREBTSOV

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. A. EL-ERIAN
Mr. M.S. AHMED
Mr. S. ABDEL-HAMID

United Kingdom:

Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. J.S.H. SHATTOCK
Mr. J.H. LAMBERT
Lord NORWICH

United States of America:

Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. V. BAKER
Mr. D. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. O. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I declare open the thirty-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): At the end of last Friday's meeting I asked to speak in order to reply to certain comments Mr. Zorin had made on my statement, but it was so late and I was not able to do so. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I should like to reply today. I shall be as brief as possible because in my opinion long speeches - floods of oratory- are not always effective. They sometimes seem to be an attempt to hide under a torrent of words the speaker's anxiety at having no very convincing arguments to put before the Conference. I shall therefore confine myself to two points.

First, Mr. Zorin insisted at Friday's meeting, as he had done last Thursday at the private meeting, that our concept of total disarmament does not include the dissolution of military alliances. Naturally he believes, on the contrary - I quote from his statement of 11 May - that

"... the very logic of general and complete disarmament raises the question of the inevitability of the dissolution of military alliances.

If our task is to create a world without weapons and wars, or, to use the expression of the United States delegation, general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, it is perfectly clear that in such a world there is not, and cannot be, any room for military alliances."

(ENDC/PV.35, p. 49)

I note incidentally - and do so with satisfaction - that Mr. Zorin now seems to have adopted the familiar words "peaceful world", which are our words, and to which he was previously opposed. I hope this will facilitate agreement on the text of the preamble. But apart from that, I am in full agreement with Mr. Zorin on the substance of his thought. For we do believe that at a certain stage in the disarmament process, with the gradual reduction and total elimination of armaments and the gradual reduction and total elimination of all bases, military alliances must cease to exist. In my opinion that is quite obvious. It might then be possible to have peaceful regional co-operation to foster world progress, but no military alliances. Arrangements for military collaboration will decline and disappear as disarmament progresses and the security of all countries, large and small, is guaranteed by the United Nations forces. That is our idea. But I should like the Soviet delegation in its turn to explain to us, amicably and very clearly, its own position on the maintenance of alliances.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

Article 2, paragraph 4 of the Soviet draft treaty provides that: "In all countries parties to the Treaty the International Disarmament Organization shall have its own staff, recruited internationally and in such a way as to ensure the adequate representation on it of all three existing groups of States." (ENDC/2 p.3). We know that the disarmament organization is to be set up to control the process of disarmament and that it is to remain in being even after general and complete disarmament has been carried out, in order to guarantee its application for ever. I therefore put this question: Is it not perhaps the Soviet Union which, by introducing the "troika" in the international disarmament organization, is betraying its aim to perpetuate the division of the world into three groups - that division which many of us do not accept even now? I asked the Soviet delegation for clarification on this point at our private meeting on Thursday; but instead of giving me any explanation it repeated its comments and its allegations that the Italian delegation is opposed to the dissolution of military alliances.

Perhaps the Soviet delegation, after hearing this morning the explanation I have given of our position, will now explain to us clearly the reasons why it thinks the world should continue to be divided into three groups even after total disarmament.

And now a second question, concerning control over the complete elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles during the first stage, as proposed by the Soviet Union. Mr. Zorin has told us, and has repeated, that this control would be 100 per cent, that is to say total control, and that we are wrong not to believe it. As a matter of fact, the explanations he gave us in his statement last Friday leave us in some doubt. Nevertheless, I shall try to interpret the Soviet doctrine with the help of the text proposed by Mr. Zorin. It seems to me that as disarmament is to be total so far as vehicles are concerned, control would also be total. This control would be the same - of the nature and the same kind - as that provided for in the Soviet plan for total disarmament - for the end of general and complete disarmament. It would, of course, be applied to one well-defined sector only; that of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

The Soviet draft treaty shows us what is meant by total control. Article 38, paragraph 2 reads:

"For purposes of control over the prevention of the re-establishment of armed forces and armaments abolished as a result of general and complete

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disarmament, the International Disarmament Organization shall have the right of access at any time to any point within the territory of each State party to the Treaty." (ENDC/2, page 24)

Does the Soviet delegation accept this kind of control for the elimination of rockets and delivery vehicles? Is this what Mr. Zorin has in mind when he speaks of 100 per cent control? That is a most important question, and I should be glad if the Soviet delegation would be good enough to give us a very clear and precise answer to it.

Lastly, I should like to add one final comment, still on the subject of control over the elimination of nuclear weapons vehicles. The elimination of vehicles in the first stage also covers artillery systems. Article 8, paragraph 1, of the Soviet draft reads:

"All artillery systems capable of serving as means of delivery for nuclear weapons shall be eliminated from the armed forces and destroyed. All subsidiary instruments and technical facilities designed for controlling the fire of such artillery systems shall be destroyed..." (ibid., p.7)

Now the armed forces of the two alliances are, I believe, at present equipped with such systems; and, as I understand the Soviet delegation's thinking on the subject, these forces, which during the first stage would number 1,700,000 men or 2,100,000 men, according to whether the Soviet proposal or the United States proposal is adopted, could no longer be equipped with nuclear artillery. How, then, are we to ensure that the remaining forces will not retain nuclear artillery systems? I am well aware that the reduction of armed forces to a certain level is a partial disarmament measure and accordingly involves only partial control. But how are we to reconcile partial control of the remaining forces with the inspection of vehicles, which must be total?

If we accepted the Soviet proposal of total elimination and total control over vehicles in the first stage, we should logically arrive at total and general control of the remaining armed forces themselves. Otherwise we should have no guarantee at all, considering the highly dangerous nature of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. Is the Soviet delegation therefore prepared to accept this control, which logically follows from their proposal that delivery vehicles should be completely eliminated in the first stage? Of course, if the Soviet delegation would show a more conciliatory and liberal attitude towards the application of control, we should be very glad indeed. That would open up most favourable

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prospects for an agreement. I only hope the old positions are not going to remain unchanged, under a cloak of new words. We must be very clear about this matter of controlling vehicles before we can make further progress; that is why I hope the Soviet delegation will be so good as to help us in our endeavour to reach a deeper understanding of its thesis.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): The United States delegation has been giving a series of expositions of the various elements that make up the United States plan, particularly regarding the first stage of a programme of general and complete disarmament. This morning I should like to discuss the topic of outer space.

However, before proceeding to this subject, I would like to say that we are giving careful study to the intervention made last Friday by the representative of Sweden. We want to give considered replies to his thought-provoking questions and we shall be doing so during succeeding meetings of the Committee.

One of the most challenging opportunities before this Committee is, as part of its effort to achieve disarmament, to prevent the development of outer space for military purposes. The issue before the Committee is this: will outer space be preserved for peaceful use or will it become another focus for the arms race?

Seventeen years ago, at the very beginning of the development of atomic power, the world had an opportunity to prevent its development for military purposes. The United States, which, we submit, was then the sole possessor of the secret of the atom, proposed that all atomic energy be placed under full international control. We all know what happened to that offer. If it had been accepted the problems before this Committee would be simple in comparison with what they are today. Let us not have the same comment made about outer space five or ten years from now.

Recently many of the nations represented here joined in a treaty to place the continent of Antarctica off limits for military development. This time we acted before it was too late -- before military development of the area had become an established fact. Moreover, the Soviet Union accepted inspection of Soviet installations and equipment over the entire continent to verify the treaty's prohibitions against nuclear explosions and any other measures of a military nature in Antarctica. We now have an opportunity to extend the

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peaceful development principles of the Antarctica treaty to the even more important region of outer space.

Many of the representatives here are aware of the long-history of United States efforts to accomplish this goal. In January 1957, before the launching of the first earth satellites and intercontinental missiles, the United States urged at the eleventh session of the General Assembly that nations take a "first step toward the objective of assuring that future developments in outer space would be devoted exclusively to peaceful and scientific purposes" by placing the testing of space vehicles under international inspection and participation (A/C.1/783, para.11).

In the autumn of 1957 the United States proposed the creation of a technical committee composed of scientists from the United States, the Soviet Union and other nations to work out the inspection system which might be necessary to assure the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful purposes. In 1958 President Eisenhower and Premier Bulganin exchanged correspondence on the subject, unfortunately with little concrete result.

During the 1960 meetings of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, the United States made proposals for, first, the prohibition of the placing into orbit of vehicles capable of mass destruction; second, advance notification of proposed launchings of space vehicles and the establishment of co-operative arrangements for communication of data obtained from such vehicles by available tracking facilities to an international body; third, measures to ensure the use of outer space for peaceful purposes only (TNCD/3, TNCD/7).

In his first State of the Union message, on 30 January 1961, President Kennedy invited the Soviet Union and other nations to join with the United States in a variety of space activities, saying that both the United States and the Soviet Union "would help themselves by removing their endeavours from the bitter and wasteful competition of the cold war." In his speech to the General Assembly on 25 September 1961 President Kennedy urged that nations of the world agree to keep "nuclear weapons from seeding new battlegrounds in outer space." He also proposed

"extending the United Nations Charter to the limits of man's exploration in the universe, reserving outer space for peaceful use, prohibiting weapons of mass destruction in space or on celestial bodies, and opening the mysteries and benefits of space to every nation. We shall propose

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further co-operative efforts between all the nations in weather prediction and eventually in weather control. We shall propose, finally, a global system of communications satellites linking the whole world in telegraph, telephone, radio and television". (A/PV.1013)

As members know, on 20 December 1961 the General Assembly unanimously approved a resolution adopting a number of President Kennedy's proposals. This resolution, first, adopted the principles that the United Nations Charter applied to outer space, and that outer space was not subject to national appropriation; second, called upon States to register with the Secretary-General objects launched into orbit or beyond, after the launching had taken place; third, recommended that member States and the World Meteorological Organization co-operate in developing greater knowledge of the forces affecting climate and of improved methods of weather forecasting; and, fourth, requested that specific steps be taken to prepare the way for the establishment of effective operational satellite communication (General Assembly resolution 1721 (XVI)).

Members are also aware that in March of this year the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to meet and discuss ideas for peaceful co-operation in outer space. As a result, the United Nations Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space resumed its work this year in New York and will continue it in Geneva later this month. I am certain we have all followed the work of that Committee with interest, and that we wish to convey to it our interest and hopes for continued progress in its difficult tasks.

It remains for us to consider the problem of outer space in a disarmament context. Members will recall the proposal made to this Committee by the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Green, at our tenth plenary meeting. He suggested that the outer space measures in the United States programme of 25 September, in the Soviet treaty outline of 15 March, and in a declaration which he read into the verbatim record of the tenth meeting be considered by the Committee of the Whole (ENDC/PV.10, p.23 et seq.). Today we are of course assembled in a plenary meeting to discuss general and complete disarmament. I will therefore devote my statement today to the measures contained in the United States and Soviet plans, although we do not of course oppose -- and, indeed, favour -- the consideration of disarmament measures relative to outer space by the Committee of the Whole as well.

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

We are encouraged when we compare the features of the measures on outer space contained in the United States and Soviet Union draft treaty outlines on disarmament. Our Canadian colleague has helpfully provided us with a paper to facilitate such a comparison (ENDC/36, p.6). Members will note the following similarities in the two proposals, to which Mr. Green also alluded.

First, both support the concept that outer space should be used for peaceful purposes only; second, both would ban the placing into orbit of weapons of mass destruction; third, both would require advance notification of the launching of space vehicles for peaceful purposes.

There are, however, some differences. First, the Soviet proposal apparently would not require advance notification of missile launchings, as would the United States proposal; and second, the Soviet draft does not provide for pre-launch inspection of missiles or for the establishment of a system to detect unreported launchings, as does the United States draft.

I will now attempt to explain the rationale behind the United States proposals; naturally, I assume our Soviet colleague will do likewise for his Government's proposals at such time as he chooses. There are four basic features in the United States outline, all aimed at promoting the peaceful use of outer space; first, prohibition of weapons of mass destruction in orbit; second, peaceful co-operation in space; third, notification and pre-launch inspection; and fourth, limitations on production of boosters for space vehicles and on related activities.

As members will recall -- and as has been frequently mentioned here -- the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations provides, with respect to the military establishment of every nation, for the elimination of all means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction. The United States believes that, consistent with this provision, the disarmament programme should not only include the reduction and elimination of present types of delivery vehicles but also preclude the possibility that at a future time weapons capable of producing mass destruction might be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space. Accordingly the United States programme provides that beginning with the first stage of disarmament the placing in orbit or stationing in outer space of weapons capable of producing mass destruction should be prohibited.

The United States programme also provides that States should give advance notification to other participating States and to the international disarmament

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organization of launchings of space vehicles and missiles, together with the track of the vehicles. One objective of this procedure is to facilitate verification, through pre-launch inspection of space vehicle rockets and their payloads, as necessary, to assure that weapons capable of producing mass destruction are not aboard such vehicles, and also to facilitate detection of any unreported launchings. Such a procedure of advance notification could also serve to reduce the possibility that peaceful launchings might be mistaken for an attack.

I have already touched on the progress made in peaceful co-operation in space and the continuation of efforts in that direction now being made within the framework of the United Nations. Unquestionably the United States will continue to support increased activity in this field. Members will also note the feature in our draft which limits the production, stockpiling and testing of boosters for space vehicles. This limitation is not intended to restrict a nation's space efforts, but rather is intended as a technique which could facilitate the implementation of the inspection and verification aspects of outer space and nuclear delivery vehicle measures.

At the present time States may not have sufficient incentive to undertake the substantial effort that would be required to place in orbit or station in outer space weapons capable of producing mass destruction. Nevertheless, the basic space technology and techniques have been demonstrated, and the possibility cannot be ruled out that at a future time a nuclear Power might seek this new type of delivery vehicle in order to gain real or supposed military or psychological advantage, or to avoid exposing itself to the possibility of technological surprise by the other side. The result might be the emergence of a new type of delivery vehicle the presence of which might further increase tensions and the risk of war. The possibility that weapons capable of producing mass destruction might be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space remains, however, neither so immediate a problem as to be viewed with alarmist urgency nor, on the other hand, so remote a problem that it does not warrant serious and timely preventive measures if these can be achieved in an acceptable manner. In this area our timely achievement of agreement could preclude the creation of serious military imbalance. The United States proposals include such possibilities.

Let us now turn to some of the elements which might be included in the verification plan for such a measure.

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First, advance notification of launchings would need to be provided in sufficient time to permit the necessary pre-launch inspection of space vehicles. Such notification should be provided with respect to all launchings of space vehicles and all launchings of relevant types of missiles. In this connexion it should be noted that the General Assembly resolution to which I have already referred provides for the furnishing of information to the Secretary-General concerning all launchings of objects into orbit or beyond. The disarmament programme should build on the experience to be gained in implementing this arrangement and should provide for advance, rather than post-launch, notification.

Second, pre-launch inspection would need to be of a character which would provide assurance that weapons of mass destruction were not aboard vehicles to be placed in orbit or stationed in outer space. Inspection should be carried out in a manner presenting the least impediment to the conduct of launchings.

Third, a network of ground-based and possibly space-borne instruments would be needed to detect any unreported launchings. The extent to which such a network could serve other disarmament verification purposes remains to be explored, but there is a possibility that it might be part of a comprehensive system set up within the international disarmament organization.

Before closing, let me reiterate that the United States is gratified by the overtures for the peaceful use of outer space which the Soviet Union made in March this year, and we hope that co-operation in this field will continue. As President Kennedy said on 8 May:

"It is my hope that the Soviet Union will co-operate constructively in the proposals which we have made so that all peoples will gain in the improvement of weather observation, communications systems and the manifold output of the peaceful application of space technology.

"Our nation is dedicated to the peaceful utilization of the knowledge acquired in this great effort. As we move forward on our own programme, we will continue to press for co-operation with all nations in the exploration and exploitation of space for peaceful purposes."

Noting that the United States is already working hand in hand with scientific groups of fifty nations, President Kennedy pledged continued United States sharing of space knowledge and benefits. He said:

"Ours is an open society and the benefits of our space programme will continue to flow through the world."

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One of the most significant results of man's movement towards outer space lies not only in material achievements, some of which are as yet unforeseen, but in the impact that man's activity in space will have in reorienting our basic processes of thought. We shall need new mental agility and imagination to cope with the problems created. This type of thinking, coupled with a spirit of co-operation, can lead us in this Conference to agreement on measures designed to assure that outer space becomes an impetus to man's peaceful progress and not a battleground of the future.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): I should like to make some brief comments on the future organization of our work.

My delegation felt that the informal meeting we had last Thursday was a valuable one. It was a meeting held on the original initiative of the representative of India, an initiative which we welcomed and which we felt was amply justified in the event. Mr. Godber, in his statement at our twenty-ninth meeting, foresaw that these meetings would increasingly prove their use. He said:

"I do not suggest that we should do away altogether with formal meetings, but if, for instance, we set aside two mornings a week for meeting, not in plenary, but informally, either together or in groups, to discuss some of the matters that confront us, we might find ourselves able to make better progress in real negotiation." (ENDC/PV.29, p.18)

The representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement at our thirty-third meeting, said:

"... I believe that we should speed up our work, in particular by holding informal meetings. In view of the fact that for informal meetings we do not have to prepare any texts of our statements..." (ENDC/PV.33, p.44)

It may not be felt that it would be desirable, at any rate for the time being, to set aside as many as two meetings a week for informal discussion, but I should like to suggest that we might at least agree for the present, in principle, to try to reserve at least one morning weekly for this purpose and that, in accordance with our agreement that informal meetings should normally be held on days on which there are no plenary meetings, this meeting should take the place of a plenary meeting.

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Therefore I should like to suggest, on behalf of my delegation, that when our two co-Chairmen meet to plan the arrangements for the work of the Conference this week they might consider setting a date for another informal meeting this week, on Wednesday or Thursday or on whatever day may commend itself to them in the light of the progress in other aspects of our work.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): Does anyone wish to comment on the suggestion just made by the United Kingdom representative?

Mr. LALL (India): We should like to support the suggestion made by the representative of the United Kingdom that the co-Chairmen consider calling an informal meeting this week on a day which will be appropriate in the light of our other work.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): If, as I take it, none of the members of the Committee opposes the idea of an informal meeting this week, and since the co-Chairmen have a rather large agenda for their meeting this afternoon, perhaps we could simplify the co-Chairmen's work by agreeing on a proposal right now. I should like to propose that instead of a plenary meeting tomorrow morning we have an informal meeting, if that is satisfactory to our Soviet colleague and the other members of the Committee.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It seems to me that a decision on whether to hold an informal meeting must be taken in every case in the light of the group of questions to be discussed at the meeting and the purpose that would be served by discussing them. I believe that such informal meetings will serve a definite purpose if we plan them in connexion with a specific group of questions.

I therefore think it would perhaps be useful for us to discuss with the United States representative approximately what group of questions should be discussed at this informal meeting. The point is that at last Thursday's meeting we dealt with a specific group of questions; replies were given on these questions but we did not in fact get beyond this stage. It might now be more profitable to consider discussing at an informal meeting the sum total of the results of our examination of the first stage of disarmament. If so, it

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would be preferable for such a meeting to be held a little later, say, on Thursday or Friday, to give us an opportunity before then of giving further consideration to specific questions which arise and which have arisen in the course of discussion. We could then hold an informal meeting to consider how to settle the controversial issues relating to the first stage. It seems to me that it would be useful to discuss this. That is why I would suggest that we do not take an advance decision now on convening such a meeting. If, however, we do take such a decision, I would suggest the meeting should be held on Thursday. In the meantime, we might discuss with the United States representative what programme of work could be fixed for the period up to Thursday so that we could, so to speak, reach a specific milestone and have an informal exchange of views on how to settle the controversial issues connected with the first stage. This would seem to me to be more fruitful.

These are the views which I wished to express at the present time. So if we settle the matter now, our decision should be that such a meeting should be convened on Thursday and that we should discuss with our co-Chairman the programme of work we can take up at our formal meetings in the interval before Thursday. If, however, my colleagues think it would be useful to have a general discussion of the whole programme before the end of the week, then no decision should be made now, but we should simply ask the two co-Chairmen to discuss the matter. I tend to prefer the first alternative: to decide now that we should hold an informal meeting on Thursday and to leave the question of what we are to do before Thursday to be discussed between the co-Chairmen. If this is agreeable to the United States co-Chairman, we could perhaps agree on this now.

One further minor point. My idea is that this informal meeting will be really informal and that there will be no records and no publicity. This is my understanding. If this is correct, we can settle the question of when it is to take place.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): The representative of the Soviet Union has suggested that, rather than to have an informal meeting tomorrow when there might be some uncertainty as to what would be discussed, it would be preferable to have the meeting on Thursday. In the interim, according to the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, the two co-Chairmen could plan the programme of work of our plenary meetings and could also agree on what would be discussed

(The Chairman, Canada)

in general, at the informal meeting. His alternative suggestion was that we should not set any definite date at this meeting for the next informal meeting, but should let the two co-Chairmen decide that question.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): We are quite agreeable to the idea of having the two co-Chairmen discuss the question further. I noted that the representative of the Soviet Union suggested that perhaps the item of discussion of the informal meeting could be the sum total, as I think he phrased it, of the first stage. My delegation has been proceeding quite systematically through the elements that make up the first stage of the United States treaty outline as compared to the elements, some similar and some different, that make up the first stage of the Soviet draft. I do not think, in all candour, that we will be finished with our exposition of the measures in stage I by the end of this week. I would therefore have some doubts about the precise item which was suggested by our Soviet colleague for discussion in the informal meeting this week.

I am gratified, however, that our Soviet colleague has brought up and paid tribute to the general idea of the usefulness of setting items for discussion. He did this in connexion with the informal meeting, and I welcome this action. But frankly I am a little puzzled. A similar suggestion with respect to the work of our plenary meetings was made by the Canadian delegation and also by the United States delegation. We proposed that we should try to determine in advance the particular topics in stage I which could usefully be discussed in the plenary meetings in order that we would all be discussing, generally, the same item on the same day. This suggestion, however, did not seem to meet with the approval of our Soviet colleague, who characterized it, contrary to our own belief, as a change in our method of work.

I would suggest that if the representative of the Soviet Union believes that it would be useful to agree on the items of discussion for our informal meetings he might reconsider his position with respect to the very sound suggestion put forward by the Canadian delegation, namely that the co-Chairmen should try to agree on specific items for discussion in plenary meetings of the Conference.

Mr. de MELLO-FRANCO (Brazil) (translation from French): From the various statements made so far - especially that of the Soviet representative and now that of the United States representative - I gather that the Soviet representative prefers the first of the alternatives which he himself suggested, namely, that we should meet on Thursday to discuss certain points chosen by him and the other co-Chairman from among the controversial issues - I believe that was his expression - arising out of the statements made by the different delegations, in regard to the first stage of the plans for general and complete disarmament submitted by the two delegations.

Thus it was not exactly the same proposal as had been made, according to what the United States representative has just said, by yourself, Mr. Chairman, and by his delegation; that is to say the idea was not to find certain general issues on which all the delegations would state their views at an official meeting.

As I understood the Soviet representative's proposal, his idea was to discuss certain points on which conflicting views had been expressed at our plenary meetings, that is to say, perhaps not so much the contradictions between the two drafts submitted to the Conference, as the opinions expressed by the different delegations on those drafts, which could serve as the basis for a less formal exchange of views at a private meeting. If this is correct - and I have no idea of what the two co-Chairmen will decide at their meeting today - I should like to draw the attention of the Conference to the fact that if it is agreed to hold a private meeting on Thursday, delegations should perhaps be informed of what is to be discussed. If the two co-Chairmen agree to select certain controversial issues for discussion on Thursday, the other delegations should obviously be informed of them, so that they can themselves be prepared to speak at the next day's meeting.

Those are the points to which I wished to draw the attention of the two co-Chairmen.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): As far as my delegation is concerned, we would be ready to fall in with either of the dates proposed for this week, indeed any date this week as may best emerge from the discussions of our co-Chairmen. I would also agree that it would be useful and calculated to enhance the value of informal meetings if there was some discussion beforehand

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of the topics which might come up, and in particular if delegations which had serious questions to put would give some advance notice of their intention. At the same time, I would suggest that it would be undesirable to try and formalize too much in advance the arrangements for informal meetings. We could fall into the error -- I think it would be an error -- of arranging exactly beforehand the topics and questions for discussion in such a way that the result would merely be a further set of lengthy speeches in reply to the questions foreshadowed, and we should find ourselves reverting to the same procedure that we follow in plenary meetings.

I should like to plead that we should leave scope for rather more informal discussion in the real sense of the word -- indicate topics beforehand, yes; have warnings of questions, yes; but that should not preclude other questions being raised, according to how the wind of the argument goes. Above all, we should try and avoid in informal meetings confining ourselves to long set speeches, but should leave some scope for the cut and thrust of friendly discussion through short statements not always and inevitably prepared beforehand.

Finally, I think our colleague from the Soviet Union raised the question of the informal character of the meetings. I think it would be desirable that we should all reach some sort of agreement in advance as to what we mean by an informal meeting. It is possible to conceive of informal meetings as really secret meetings in which we all agree that no word should be said to anyone of what passes. I am quite sure if that is the intention and that is our general agreement, it will be observed. At the same time experience of other meetings in the United Nations and elsewhere suggests that to aim at having a meeting absolutely secret is to set one's sights very high -- in fact it is not very often done; and even when it is done it is not always successful.

It is possible to conceive of another procedure in which we aim to have the meetings informal but not secret. In that case delegations may be free to give broad indications, if they wish to do so at any rate, of the attitudes which they have themselves maintained at such meetings.

Those I think are the two broad alternatives. My delegation has no particular view about which is the right one, but it might be of advantage if we tried to reach some meeting of mind, perhaps by discussion between the two co-Chairmen, as to exactly what set of rules on that subject it is our common wish to observe.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): The position as I understand it from the discussion about our future procedure is that, in response to the suggestion of the representative of the Soviet Union, we should fix an informal meeting for Thursday, and that the co-Chairmen should try to decide the topics to be discussed at that time. The representative of the United States said he was agreeable to Thursday, and I think also agreeable to having a discussion to decide the topic. He said that, in view of the explanations still to be given of the United States draft programme for the first stage, it would not be feasible at the next informal meeting to cover all of the first stage questions which have come up and the differences which have become apparent. That, however, would not preclude, I take it, the discussion of such differences of opinion and differences of approach as had appeared up to the time of that meeting.

The representative of Brazil made the point that the co-Chairmen, as soon as they have decided on the topics to be discussed at the informal meeting, should let the rest of the Committee know, and I presume that could be done tomorrow morning.

The representative of the United Kingdom added that perhaps advance notice of questions to be asked at this informal meeting might be useful so that good replies could be given by those to whom the questions were addressed. He also made a plea for not too much formality and, I think, not too long speeches -- in any case, not set speeches.

There is also the question of the character of the meeting and whether the proceedings of this informal meeting should be considered as secret, or at any rate as not the subject of interviews to be given out to the Press. The final suggestion of the representative of the United Kingdom was that this too might be a subject for discussion between the co-Chairmen, who would presumably advise the Committee of what they had been able to agree in this matter. The Committee would then decide whether it wanted to have the proceedings of this informal meeting completely confidential and not subject to any Press communiques. Thus we will all know beforehand whether there is going to be any communication to the Press of what is discussed in the meeting, or whether we are going to proceed under the same general rules that we observe with regard to the plenary meetings.

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): I think we all agree that some idea might be given of the questions to be discussed at an informal meeting. But these informal meetings, to which we attach great importance, are in the nature of a very frank, full and free discussion. So I should not like the informal meeting to be confronted with a fixed agenda, so to speak.

I hope that, if the two co-Chairmen decide to adopt this new method of giving us an agenda in advance, we shall still be able to exchange ideas on all the problems we have in mind with complete frankness. To preserve the proper character of these meetings I think it is essential for the exchange of views to be completely candid, completely free, and not subject to too many restrictions.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): It is clear from the exchange of views that has just taken place that we agree on a number of questions connected with informal meetings. First, there would appear to be no objection to fixing such a meeting for Thursday of this week. As I understand it, the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom and other representatives have no objection to this date. I think this point can, therefore, be regarded as agreed.

Secondly, with regard to the nature of this meeting, I understand from the statements by a number of delegations that they agree it would be useful to outline a set of topics for discussion at this informal meeting. Some delegations, however, have said that they are opposed to limiting delegations to such a specific set of topics or to a fixed agenda. I think we can agree that this meeting should be mainly devoted to the controversial issues relating to the first stage of disarmament. In other words, the issues which proved to be controversial during the discussion of the first stage should be the main subject of discussion at the informal meeting. Clearly, these issues may give rise to differences of opinion and their range is quite broad. I think it would be desirable not to discuss all questions indiscriminately but to concentrate on those connected with the first stage of disarmament. I think we can agree on this point.

If the United States representative thinks that all the topics he feels should be discussed will not have been brought up by then, we will, of course, only discuss the range of topics which has already been brought up. This does not mean that we limit any further discussions; it means that we would confine

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ourselves for the time being to matters which have already been discussed at formal meetings, which have been a source of controversy and on which it is necessary to harmonize our positions. It seems to me that the purpose of our informal meetings is to exchange views informally on controversial issues and to try and find ways of settling them.

So I think there will be no disagreement between us either on having an exchange of views on the controversial issues relating to the first stage with a view to finding ways of settling these issues and on doing so without specifying the detailed points to be discussed, because if we were to begin specifying these points now, we would spend more time on this than on the discussion of the questions themselves. I do not think there is any point in doing this and, moreover, many delegations have quite rightly pointed out that we should not limit delegations to a specific set of questions. I do not think we should do so. We can agree with this view.

In my opinion, it would be enough for us to have such a general range of topics in order to have a profitable discussion on Thursday. This is the second point on which I think we can agree.

With regard to the nature of this meeting, I think the United Kingdom representative is bringing up all these questions rather unnecessarily. After all, we are adults and know very well that if everyone taking part in our work recognises the value of an informal exchange of views in order to find a way of settling controversial issues -- and this is the purpose of such informal meetings -- then it is obvious that publicity for such meetings will hardly be helpful. This does not mean that the Soviet delegation rules out publicity in general. By all means arrange publicity for yourselves and we will do the same. But will this be helpful to our private exchange of views? I think that this is hardly the case. This is my personal opinion. But if you believe that publicity is necessary, we are not opposed to this. On the contrary, we have always been in favour of all meetings of the Committee being held in public. So this presents no difficulty for us. But simply from the standpoint of the interests of our work here, if we want an informal exchange of views so that we can try to harmonize our positions, it is obvious that publicity is hardly advantageous. That is my first point.

In the second place, the United Kingdom representative said that complete secrecy is impossible. But this, after all, depends on us. We each have

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three or four official representatives here. No representatives of the Press are present. How can news of all this reach the Press unless one of us divulges information to the representatives of the Press? It obviously cannot reach the Press unless one or other delegation sees fit to release some information to the Press. This is obvious to everyone. As I understand it, the United Kingdom representative believes that he ought to release information to the Press; that is the impression I gathered from his statement. If he considers it proper and desirable to do so, let him go ahead; everyone will simply draw their own conclusions. What of it? After all, we cannot prohibit any delegation from doing something it wishes to do. By all means do this and then everyone will follow suit.

The question is whether or not we want this. I gather from conversations with many delegations that the majority think it undesirable for the questions discussed at our informal meetings to be extensively reported in the Press. That is how I understood the attitude and views of various delegations. If we agree with this, delegations must draw the appropriate conclusions. If they do not do so, that is their affair; all the others will then draw their own conclusions. I do not think there is any point in our adopting any formal decision. Each delegation should act in accordance with the consensus of opinion, and what one delegation does will determine what the others do. If it is the consensus of opinion that we should not have verbatim records and should reduce the size of our delegations at these informal meetings in order to make the discussion as private as possible, the appropriate conclusions must be drawn. What kind of privacy can there be if everything is divulged? I think this is quite obvious to everyone.

It seems to me that if no one has any objection, we might agree that we shall have an informal discussion, without verbatim records and without any information being given to the Press, the purpose of this discussion being to try to bring our positions closer together, to clear up certain controversial issues and to facilitate the attainment of agreement. If we agree on this, all delegations must draw the appropriate conclusions. This is the third point on which I think we could agree.

With regard to the question raised by the United States representative about the further planning of our work as a whole, I think his understanding of our position is not quite correct. We are opposed to drawing up a time-table for the discussion of questions. We are opposed to doing this. We say that the subject

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of our discussion at the present time is the first stage. The first stage raises a wide range of questions concerning the content of the basic measures of disarmament, of a series of related measures and of measures of control. By all means let us discuss this range of questions. If, however, you wish to select two or three questions from this range of questions and decide that we should discuss one question today, another tomorrow and yet another the day after tomorrow, and so forth, we are opposed to this, because the first stage of disarmament is now confined to a specific set of questions, and we should therefore discuss this set of questions. This applies both to informal meetings and to plenary meetings. We will later have a set of questions connected with the second stage and then a set of questions connected with the third stage, so let us proceed in this way, without singling out any questions.

Today you raised the question of outer space. This does come within the programme of measures for the first stage, although you ranged a little further afield than this. Every delegation is, however, entitled to go beyond the scope of particular questions being discussed at one or other stage of disarmament, if he sees fit. But this does not mean that we should discuss outer space today and nothing else. I think this would be wrong, quite apart from the fact that we would clearly never agree on laying down the exact procedure for its discussion. Why should we lay this down? It is not worth wasting time on it.

But this comment is by the way. It seems to me that we could now agree on three points: first, that we should meet on Thursday; secondly, that the general theme of discussion should be the controversial issues relating to the first stage and possible ways of settling them; and thirdly, that the discussion should be really informal, without verbatim records and without any information being released on what is being discussed.

If we can reach agreement on these three points, I think that would complete our procedural business for today.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I should just like to confirm, on behalf of my delegation, our agreement to the points that Mr. Zorin has just mentioned. We are quite willing to agree to Thursday for the informal meeting. We are quite willing to have as the general topic of that meeting the controversial issues, as they have developed thus far, in stage I. My delegation is quite

(Mr. Stelle, United States)

ready, as I understand the United Kingdom delegation is, to have these meetings private and not to have Press briefings after the meetings. We share the view of the representative of the United Kingdom that the important thing is to have an agreement before the meeting on whether or not there will be Press briefings after the meeting. Last Thursday we did not have any firm agreement before the meeting and consequently there were some protests about how the meeting was handled with the Press later.

As far as my delegation is concerned, we are quite happy to agree to having the informal meetings private, with no Press briefings afterwards; although quite frankly I share Sir Michael Wright's scepticism -- as I understood it -- about whether it will be possible to avoid any word at all of the meeting somehow finding its way into the Press.

Sir Michael WRIGHT (United Kingdom): The representative of the Soviet Union did not, I think, understand quite correctly what was in my mind when I spoke about the private character of what is said at informal meetings. The interpretation given to what I said by the representative of the United States was accurate. My point was the desirability of our agreeing beforehand on the character of what was said. I added that my own delegation, and I felt quite sure all other delegations, would in fact abide loyally by whatever it is we have agreed upon, provided we have agreed upon it.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I think that we can say the co-Chairmen are agreed on the following: that the informal meeting should be Thursday; that the principal topic to be discussed should be the points of controversy or disagreement between the Soviet Union draft treaty and the United States outline for a basic treaty; and that the meeting should be considered private, the number of persons from each delegation should be restricted and we should all agree beforehand that we will not divulge to the Press what occurs during the meeting and the attitudes taken by the delegations during the meeting -- the purpose being to enable us to have a freer discussion and to explore tentatively possibilities of compromise and modification of positions on those controversial subjects.

Is that agreeable to all the other delegations? Would we all be willing to adhere to this principle of keeping to ourselves what goes on in this meeting and not giving Press briefings or otherwise divulging to the Press the contents of the matters discussed?

Mr. MACOVESCU (Romania): Shall we decide now how many persons from each delegation will attend?

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I think that at the last meeting it was decided that there would be only four persons representing each delegation. I take it that the same would be the case for the forthcoming meeting.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): I wonder if we need to make it quite that rigid. Just in terms of the work load, even though we are not reporting what happens to the Press my Government is going to be as interested in what goes on in the informal meetings as in what goes on in the formal meetings. Thus our problem of making reports and drafting telegrams is the same for the informal meetings as for the formal meetings.

I should like to suggest that each delegation follow the general principle that there will be fewer people at the informal meetings than at the plenary meetings, but that we should not place any rigid limitation of four or five. I think each delegation should use its own best judgement as to what constitutes a sufficiently small number to give the meeting the character that we all want it to have, but I do not think, at the same time, that we should have so rigid a ceiling on the numbers of representatives present as to interfere with the work. I suggest we leave it at three, four or five, according to the judgement of each delegation; and if for some particular topic a delegation thinks it must have six I think that should not be regarded as a breach of our agreement.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I think we can agree to three, four or five, but we should keep it to the minimum. I do not think there is need for further discussion on this rather secondary point.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): When we discussed this question the opinion was expressed - I think quite rightly - that at these informal meetings there should be frank conversations, not speeches such as we make here. There should be questions and answers - in short, a conversation which can throw light on our work and on all the controversial issues.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): I think that unless the Committee wishes to pursue this subject further, we are agreed on the date of the next informal meeting, the conditions which will govern it and the principal topic for discussion.

Mr. LALL (India): I would like to make a few comments today on some remarks made at previous meetings, particularly at the meeting held on 11 May. This may be an appropriate time to make them because tomorrow, if the occasion arises, we may wish to offer a few comments on outer space.

First, may I say that we thought a very valuable statement was made on 11 May by Mr. Dean, the United States representative. This statement was remarkably frank and put certain issues squarely before us. For example, near the beginning of his statement Mr. Dean dwelt at some length on the fact that at present the world military picture is that of two great military alliances and he spoke of some of the geographic and other factors involved in their positions.

We think it is valuable for us to be reminded every now and again of these factors because they obviously play a part in the thinking of the United States, and undoubtedly in the thinking of the Soviet Union, in drawing up plans for disarmament and in suggesting measures to us. They also colour the views of the two delegations regarding such important matters as balance in the diminution of armament until we reach zero, as we hope to do in the course of a full disarmament plan. Therefore, we welcomed the frankness of our United States colleague.

I would like to draw attention in particular to the following remark made by Mr. Dean, with which we find ourselves very much in agreement:

"It is precisely because of this that both sides find themselves overwhelmingly dissatisfied with the amount of national security which each gets from its vast armaments and from the armaments race. That is why we have this great impetus towards general and complete disarmament. Let me say clearly, without equivocation, that the United States is 100 per cent for general and complete disarmament.

Let there be no doubt on that point." (ENDC/PV.35, p.7)

We welcomed that statement not only because some doubts had previously been expressed -- let us be frank -- about positions in this Committee, but also because it reiterates the United States position and makes clear that there is to be no veering from the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I would like to comment now on a somewhat different kind of point which emerged from the same statement. At two places Mr. Dean seemed to introduce a new concept into the consideration of the whole question of general and complete disarmament. For example, he said:

"My delegation is firmly convinced, however, that we must not disturb the existing military pattern while we are carrying out the process of abolition." (ibid.)

Later in his statement he again said, in commenting upon the 100 per cent elimination of delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons proposed by the Soviet Union:

"... we would have a result that unbalances the existing military pattern by liquidating delivery vehicles ..." (ibid., p.III)

The Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations speaks in paragraph 5 of the need to preserve balance as we go through the process of disarmament, but it does not speak of the need to preserve the existing military pattern. I would like to make this point because, while I do not in principle disagree with the United States representative that the pattern may bear some correlation to the balance, it is not precisely what we are asked to do. We are not asked to preserve a pattern of armament. In fact, if we were asked to do so, it might be argued later -- and that is another reason why this point is of great importance -- that when we had disarmed fully we should still preserve in our national militia and so on the same pattern of armament, namely nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. That is a view to which the delegation of India is opposed. We do not think that weapons of mass destruction, and particularly nuclear weapons, should be preserved throughout the process of disarmament. Certainly we do not think they should be preserved at the end of the disarmament period when we are contemplating what will be the content of national forces and of forces to be placed at the disposal of the United Nations.

So we would like to think that the main emphasis of the delegation of the United States will remain on the terms of paragraph 5 of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles as it was accepted both by the United States and the Soviet Union and, later, by the United Nations through a General Assembly resolution. I would welcome at some point, not necessarily today -- perhaps even at an informal meeting -- some clarification of this particular issue.

(Mr. Lall, India)

I turn now to another aspect of the speech, in which Mr. Dean expressed the view that while the United States plan had frankly put a veto provision into the transitional items which appear between the stages of disarmament, and indeed at the end of the third stage of disarmament also, the Soviet Union had achieved the same purpose without actually saying so. I would like to raise this question with our Soviet colleague and ask him to clarify the position of the Soviet Union on this particular point, as to whether or not there would be veto provisions between the stages of the disarmament plan. In asking for this clarification, I would add that our view would tend to be that a veto provision would not be necessary.

We would agree with the representative of the United States in essence that unless the first stage had been satisfactorily completed it would be unrealistic to expect the United States and the Soviet Union, particularly, as leaders of the two great military alliances today, to go forward to the subsequent stage of the plan. We accept that view, which is essentially realistic. But surely, if we had the normal voting arrangement of the United Nations, namely, a two-thirds majority in the control body or in the international disarmament organization, that provision would give sufficient assurance that there would be no incautious or blind movement from one stage to another without due consideration of the progress which had been achieved in the first stage of the plan and then, later, in the second stage and so on. We do not see why it is necessary to invoke the veto provisions of the Charter in this matter, and we would hope that some further attention can be given to this view.

Furthermore, while one would agree that both sides must be broadly satisfied at the end of each stage that the progress of disarmament warrants going forward to the next stage, one must remember that the Security Council veto provisions cover more than just the two sides, and indeed there is no knowing whether after a few years the Security Council may have more permanent members; I am not saying it will, but it might. Is it necessary to give the right of veto to all permanent members of the Security Council in the context of our disarmament plan? We would think it would not be necessary, and we hope that the matter can be reconsidered, as I said.

Meanwhile, we would also welcome clarification from our Soviet colleague on the precise thinking of his government, as incorporated in the Soviet draft plan, regarding this important matter. It is most important because it affects the

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continuity of the disarmament plan. We are persuaded to the view expressed here by other members of this Conference that the continuity of the plan, once it has been adopted, must be maintained.

I should like to make another brief set of remarks, relating to the very important question of control or verification measures. We feel that we can now say that there is some groping towards, some approaching of, common ground and a further understanding between the two sides regarding this important matter. I would like to draw attention to certain statements which were made by our Soviet colleague on Friday when he quoted from Mr. Dean's statement. This was a very important quotation in which Mr. Dean, commenting on the question of the destruction of delivery vehicles, said that:

"the international disarmament organization could watch the destruction of each delivery vehicle that the Soviet Union was prepared to offer for destruction, but ... it could not -- I repeat, could not -- verify that all vehicles had in fact been offered." (ENDC/PV.33, p. 40)

In other words, Mr. Dean raised a very important point: and he asked how we were to know that every single vehicle for the delivery of nuclear weapons had been destroyed.

To this question Mr. Zorin replied by saying that he would like to ask Mr. Dean on what grounds he made these statements. Mr. Zorin went on to say:

"When and where did the Soviet delegation say that the international disarmament organization, in the course of the complete elimination of the means of delivering nuclear weapons, would not be in a position to ascertain that all such means were actually being eliminated?" (ENDC/PV.35, p. 59)

It seems to us that at the very least this statement by Mr. Zorin means that the Soviet Union is of the opinion that measures of control should be such that we all have assurance that every single vehicle for the delivery of nuclear weapons will in fact be eliminated, or that the Soviet Union has this matter under study and will clarify its position even further when we come to the details of control measures for each particular item of disarmament. We are glad that this approaching of the two positions appears to be taking place, although, of course, it does not seem to be complete at this time.

I do not wish to burden the Committee with further quotations because members have the verbatim record before them. It will be seen that at one point

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Mr. Zorin also said, when talking about the search for hidden weapons, that in principle we are all in favour of it; but he asked other members of the Committee how they proposed to make such a search for every single hidden weapon over the whole length and breadth of the United States and the Soviet Union. We hope that in the course of the next few days, and perhaps in the course of the forthcoming informal meeting, it will be possible for our colleagues to clarify further these issues of control. They are very important issues, and we in the delegation of India are glad that the process of clarification is taking us slowly forward to agreement.

Before I close, may I say that we too were very interested in all the questions which the representative of Sweden raised last Friday and hope we will soon have some clarification of those questions from the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union.

May I, however, express the view -- and I hope the representative of Sweden will not mind my saying this -- that his very interesting points on the question of nuclear delivery weapons were slightly different from the point which we are considering. Whereas we are considering the question of the elimination of vehicles for the delivery of nuclear weapons, our colleague from Sweden raised the point of carriers of nuclear weapons. I submit that the carriage -- the transport -- of nuclear weapons is something slightly different from the means of delivery, the vehicle for the delivery of nuclear weapons, the difference being, quite clearly, that carriage means the taking of the weapon from point "A" to point "B", whereas a vehicle for delivery is not only a means of carriage from point "A" to point "B" but a means of using the vehicle effectively as a weapon at point "B".

I think this is a matter of relevance, because it does simplify to some extent -- a small extent -- the question of the relevant control measures. I say "to a small extent" because I realize that in any event the question of verification measures is a complex one; but I am glad to feel, myself, that it is a little simpler, perhaps, than was indicated in that particular question of our colleague from Sweden.

The CHAIRMAN (Canada): It might be possible to clear up without further delay the last point raised by the representative of India. As representative of Canada I may say that the term "nuclear weapon delivery vehicles" has always seemed to me to be pretty clumsy. "Delivery vehicle" always conveys to

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me a picture of a grocery cart, or something like that. We prefer to say "nuclear weapon vehicles", the word "vehicles" having been adopted from the French véhicules, the term under which I believe this idea was first introduced into the disarmament discussions.

My understanding of the question of the representative of Sweden was that when he referred to "nuclear weapon carriers" he used the word "carriers" in exactly the same meaning as the word "vehicles". Perhaps the representative of Sweden would like to either confirm or deny that understanding.

Mr. EDBERG (Sweden): I confirm that that interpretation of our use of the words "nuclear weapon carriers" is quite right.

Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): The representative of Italy has expressed his displeasure once already at the fact that the Soviet delegation speaks at too late a stage and delays the discussion of a question. I must therefore apologize to the representative of Italy for also asking to speak now, although it is after midday. As, however, there is a full hour left before lunch, I think I shall be able to use this time without causing any delay and even leaving time for the representative of Italy to reply, should he wish to do so.

I should like to present some preliminary views of the Soviet delegation on a matter that was touched upon at our last meeting on 11 May by the Swedish representative. Since Mr. Edberg, the representative of Sweden, put a number of questions to the Soviet and the United States delegations, we thought it might be useful if we tried to give our answers to these questions if only in a preliminary and perhaps incomplete form. As we have some time left, I shall take the liberty of doing so today.

At the meeting on 11 May, Mr. Edberg, the representative of Sweden, addressed a number of questions to the Soviet and the United States delegations in connexion with their proposals on general and complete disarmament. We should like to give preliminary answers to these questions today. The first question which Mr. Edberg asked was:

"Would it not be worth considering, for example, making the time period for the first disarmament stage a little longer than in the Soviet proposal, and making the periods of the second and third stages a little shorter than in the United States proposal?" (ENDC/PV.35 p.29)

(Mr. Zorin, USSR)

Mr. Edberg went straight on to ask the Soviet delegation to explain its proposals with regard to time-limits.

Our position on time-limits is governed by the two following considerations, which in our opinion are decisive. First, it is obvious that the main objective at present is to deliver the peoples as speedily as possible from the danger of a nuclear war and the burden of the armaments race. It is quite clear that the sooner we achieve general and complete disarmament, the better the cause of peace will be served, the sooner the peoples will be liberated from fear of the future and the sooner States will be able to use their human and material resources for the development of their economies. Even from the standpoint of what may be termed the internal requirements of disarmament -- the need for control and the need to safeguard the security of States -- a more rapid disarmament process has definite advantages. I shall not repeat the convincing arguments put forward on this subject by Mr. Lall, because you are all familiar with them.

The second consideration which the Soviet Government took into account was the practical feasibility of implementing general and complete disarmament. We certainly do not wish to set ourselves or other States impossible tasks and, in making our calculations, we took careful account of all the available data on this point. In this connexion, I shall mention several facts drawn from experience of reconversion after the Second World War. As we all know, virtually all States succeeded in reducing their enormous armed forces and converting their economies to civilian production in the extremely short period of approximately two to three years. By May, 1945, the Soviet Union had 11,365,000 men in its armed forces. A month after Victory Day, thirteen older age groups were demobilized from the forces on active service. In September, 1945, or about three months after the end of the war, ten more age groups were demobilized. In March, 1946, the next six age groups were demobilized. As a result, the strength of the Soviet Union's armed forces was reduced to 2,874,000 men by 1948. Thus, in a period of approximately two to three years, 8.5 million men were demobilized. This figure gives some idea of the immense task which was accomplished in a short period of time. It was, after all, not a question of simply releasing men from the army, but of finding them jobs, resettling them in civilian employment. Yet, I repeat, all this was done within a period of only two to three years.

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We know that other States also had similar achievements to their credit. According to information available in the Press, the United States demobilized approximately 10 million and the United Kingdom approximately 4 million men during the same period of two to three years, that is, from 1945 to 1948. I am referring to the figures for the strength of the armed forces. But it is also well known that during the war years the industry of these States was essentially a war industry and that a high proportion of plants and factories was engaged in arms production. During the same period of two to three years, these plants and factories were converted to peaceful production.

I would now ask the representatives here in this chamber to consider the proposal made by the Soviet Union in its draft treaty, in relation to the scale of the reduction after World War II and the period of time in which it was carried out. I am sure each of you will realize how well founded and realistic are the time limits we have proposed both for the individual stages of disarmament and for the programme as a whole.

In this connexion, we are surprised at the position taken by the Western Powers and primarily by the United States and United Kingdom, whose representatives in the Committee are persistently harping on the idea that we should not hurry with disarmament and that it cannot be carried out within the time-limits proposed by the Soviet Union.

The second question raised by Mr. Edberg concerned the balance to be preserved during the process of disarmament. He asked us to explain how the principle of balance is implemented in our proposals on general and complete disarmament. Where the first stage of disarmament is concerned, this principle is specifically reflected in the fact that our proposal for the complete elimination of the means of delivery of nuclear weapons is linked up with the dismantling of foreign bases on alien territory and with a major reduction of armed forces and so-called conventional armaments.

I shall not go into the reasons why it is necessary to eliminate the means of delivering nuclear weapons during the first stage. I have given a sufficiently detailed explanation on this point.

It is, however, quite obvious that if only the means of delivery are eliminated, States having bases in foreign territories will gain certain military advantages. Therefore, in order to exclude such advantages and to preserve the balance between both sides, it is necessary to eliminate foreign

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military bases in alien territories. As we know, however, attempts are made to justify the existence of foreign military bases in alien territories by reference to the alleged superiority of the Soviet Union in armed forces and conventional armaments.

While we consider such assertions groundless, they are nevertheless made. Therefore, in order to give the other side a sense of confidence, we propose that armed forces should be drastically reduced to a level which would allay any apprehensions of the other side.

Mr. Edberg, in explaining his question, asked whether it would not be possible to make a higher reduction of conventional armaments than is envisaged for the first stage under our plan. The Soviet delegation has already drawn attention to the fact that the Soviet Union proposes a considerably greater reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments than does the United States. In the specific case of conventional armaments, including tanks, as a result of the implementation of the first stage measures, States are to retain only such quantities of these weapons as are necessary to equip the remaining armed forces, i.e., 1.7 million men each for the Soviet Union and the United States respectively.

I have already explained the reasons why we stopped at the level of 1.7 million men. This level was at one time suggested by the United States and we decided to accept it in order to avoid needless disagreement. Nevertheless, as I have already said, the Soviet Union is prepared to agree to a more drastic reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, if the United States and the other Western Powers would also be prepared to do so.

Mr. Edberg's third, fourth and fifth questions concerned the system of zonal inspection advocated by the United States. We have already indicated our general attitude towards this proposal, and see no need to restate it. It does not solve the problem of control, nor does it facilitate the attainment of agreement.

I should merely like to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that, as is apparent from the Swedish representative's statement, he himself is aware of the negative aspects of the proposal for zonal inspection. He quite rightly points out that zonal inspection by no means eliminates the danger of important information being disclosed which might be used to the detriment of the security of States. To put it bluntly, zonal inspection can only develop

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into a more highly organized system of military intelligence work, carried out square by square, so to speak, in the zones that present the greatest interest.

Referring to the fact that before disarmament begins, States will have to submit declarations or statements about their armaments and armed forces to be reduced or eliminated, as provided in the Soviet draft treaty, the representative of Sweden noted:

"An undertaking to give such a declaration would evidence a certain belief in the will of other Powers to honour the treaty. As such it could be a confidence-creating factor of great value". (ENDC/PV.35 p.33)

This remark rightly points to the source of the changes for the better in relations among States that will be brought about by general and complete disarmament.

This might well be borne in mind by those who not only view general and complete disarmament in the distorted mirror of the present relations of distrust between States, but are even doing their utmost to exaggerate the question of lack of confidence and to imply that States intend to begin violating and by-passing the treaty the day after it has been signed.

I shall not deal fully with the Swedish representative's sixth question, which is moreover framed in such a way that it can lead us into a maze of futile debate. There is, however, one point I would like to stress. As I have already mentioned, under the Soviet draft treaty, States would have to submit information on their armed forces and armaments that are subject to reduction. But we cannot submit information on the location of armed forces and military installations, and we do not demand that other States should do so. It is self-evident that so long as nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them exist, it might be extremely dangerous for States to disclose their vital centres. In order to avoid controversy, I shall not quote statements by United States military men about the present importance of specifying targets for bombing. I would merely like to say that the United States proposals for a so-called percentage reduction of delivery vehicles, accompanied by control for the purpose of detecting concealed weapons, would lead to a situation where, before the completion of general and complete disarmament -- if this ever takes place at all under the United States plan -- the danger of a nuclear blow would not only remain, but would become infinitely greater, because the United States proposals on control mean providing opportunities to locate targets for attack. It is

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precisely for this reason that the United States proposals cannot provide a basis for the solution of the disarmament problem.

The Swedish representative's seventh question was when the inspection system would start to operate in stage I and how it would be carried out. Under the Soviet proposals -- I draw the Swedish representative's attention to article 19 of the Soviet draft treaty -- the stage I of disarmament begins six months after the treaty comes into force.

On the expiry of the six-month period, the international disarmament organization must be ready and start to exercise its functions, and it must be ready not only at headquarters but also in the field, that is, in the territories of States. Before disarmament begins, that is, before the six-month period has elapsed, States will provide the International Disarmament Organization with such information about their armed forces, armaments, military production and military appropriations as is necessary for the implementation of the stage I measures.

Six months after the treaty comes into force, States will begin implementing disarmament measures, which are to be carried out, from first to last, under the supervision of inspectors of the International Disarmament Organization. Thus, under our proposals, inspection and control would begin from the very outset of disarmament.

Mr. Edberg also asked where the inspection or control would take place, whether it would be carried out in the actual place where units and armaments were located or at some other place or point where military units were disbanded and armaments destroyed.

I think that a full answer to this question is given in the Soviet draft treaty. We adopt a practical approach to this question. In the case of fixed installations, for instance, enterprises engaged in the production of military equipment that is to be destroyed or eliminated, launching pads, rockets, etc. inspection and control must be carried out where these installations are located. In the case of movable installations, the Soviet delegation believes that we should simply agree on the most rational procedure for controlling them. It may prove far more convenient to transfer some types of military equipment to specific localities for destruction rather than to destroy them on the spot. It is quite obvious that the actual process of destruction may require the use of some industrial capacity; instead of reducing rockets, aircraft, etc. to scrap metal in the places where they are located, for example, in depots or at airfields,

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it may therefore prove more rational to transfer them to specific localities where it would be easier to destroy them.

In short, we believe that this is a purely practical question and one on which we could easily reach agreement after we have settled the main issue, namely, what we are going to destroy, when we are going to destroy it and in what quantities.

Mr. Edberg's eighth question was as follows:

"... what sort of personnel reduction is aimed at in the Soviet proposal? Does the reduction include both regulars and conscripts and, if so, in the same proportion between these two categories as in a field unit?" (ENDC/PV.35, p.35)

We provide for the reduction of all types of armed forces and of all categories of military personnel. The main emphasis in our proposal is on the disbanding of entire military units, and this is an essential stipulation if the re-establishment of armed forces is to be prevented. At the same time this method of reduction makes it possible to circumvent the problem of variations in the organization of armed forces in different States. In passing, I should like to point out that there are no grounds for the apprehensions expressed by the United States and some other Western representatives that the Soviet draft treaty will leave room for transfers of some kind within armed forces and categories of armaments. This fear is baseless. I doubt whether there is any strategist who would arm the troops remaining at his disposal with, say, only tanks or only artillery. Such an army would not be equipped for either defensive or offensive action and consequently would not ensure the security of a State. In every army there will have to be a correlation between branches of the service and categories of armaments that is satisfactory for the army concerned. We take this into account in treating reduction and destruction primarily in terms of the armaments of complete military units.

Mr. Edberg's ninth question was on the subject of bases. Our Swedish colleague correctly pointed out that the Soviet proposal lays stress on the necessity to eliminate foreign military bases in alien territories, because the Soviet Union views them as particularly menacing to peace. However, as I understood him, he has the idea that the military importance of any base, whether foreign or national, is a result of geography, history and the political situation of today. In this connexion, he asked whether, in view of their

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geographical location, national military bases should not be placed on the same footing as some foreign military bases in alien territories. In other words, the purpose of Mr. Edberg's question was to find out whether we could not make some differentiation in our approach to the dismantling of military bases, depending upon the degree of danger which a particular base presents to peace.

We agree that this problem calls for the most careful differentiation and we have repeatedly made this point in our comments and explanations. We continue to maintain that no defence interests are served by foreign military bases which have been supplied with the forces and equipment for aggressive action or have been prepared to accommodate such forces and equipment and which are situated many thousands of miles from the frontiers of the State concerned. These are bases for aggression, spring-boards for attack. Surely, gentlemen, this does not require any special proof.

It will be recalled that, during the aggressive operations against Egypt and the countries of the Near and Middle East, the armed forces of the United Kingdom, France and the United States used NATO naval and air bases in Italy and in a number of other NATO countries. It will be recalled that the United States military air base in Adana (Turkey) was used for concentrating and despatching interventionist troops during the aggressive operations by the United States in Lebanon. It will be recalled, finally, that United States air bases in Norway, Turkey and Pakistan have been used by the United States for aggressive operations against the Soviet Union, examples of which were the U.2 espionage flights over Soviet territory.

I would point out, gentlemen, that it was not the Soviet Union which undertook aggressive operations against the countries of the Near and Middle East or against the United States from its bases in Trans-Caucasia, but the United States which undertook such operations against Lebanon and the Soviet Union from its bases in Turkey and Pakistan. Surely the difference must by now be obvious between a foreign military base in Turkey and a national base of the Soviet Union in Soviet Trans-Caucasia, about which questions are so often put to us.

Here you have the results of geography, history and the political situation of today. Here you have the difference between foreign military bases in alien territories and national military bases. In the light of all these considerations, we can reply to our Swedish colleague as follows: No foreign military base can

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be placed on the same footing as any national military base. That is why all foreign bases must be dismantled first and as early as the first stage of disarmament. But we nevertheless fully support Mr. Edberg's idea about the need to take account of geography, history and the political situation of today. It is of course, possible and necessary to differentiate between foreign military bases from this standpoint. For example, consideration of these three factors must inevitably lead us to the conclusion that foreign military bases situated in Europe should be dismantled first, at the very outset of the first stage of disarmament.

In his tenth question the Swedish representative asked how we would more closely define nuclear weapon carriers. We consider that our draft treaty contains the necessary definition of nuclear weapon carriers and that this definition is fully adequate for the purposes of an agreement on general and complete disarmament. It seems to us that the problem of specific types, categories and forms of nuclear weapon carriers will solve itself, since, under our draft treaty, States must submit information on nuclear weapon delivery vehicles before a start is made on the implementation of the first stage measures.

This information will, of course, include data on the weight and other characteristics of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles so that in our opinion, no difficulties should arise in this matter.

In referring to Mr. Burns' observations about so-called potential nuclear weapon carriers, the Swedish representative quite rightly pointed out that the conversion of ships or aircraft into nuclear weapon carriers is a complex technical process. Generally speaking, the ideas put forward by Mr. Burns are somewhat unrealistic and, in our opinion, academic. One only needs to take a quick look at the Soviet draft treaty to appreciate the artificiality of the problem raised by the Canadian representative. We are in fact providing for the establishment of control over enterprises engaged wholly or partly in the production of nuclear weapon carriers. In these circumstances how would it be possible to undertake the conversion of passenger aircraft or merchant ships into nuclear weapon carriers? Such an operation would obviously be quite inconceivable.

We now come to Mr. Edberg's eleventh question. I think that my statement at our meeting on 11 May to all intents and purposes answered this question and I therefore see no need to cover the same ground again.

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The Swedish representative's last question was largely concerned with his idea that it might be feasible to transfer to the first stage the elimination of such means of mass destruction as chemical and biological weapons. We appreciate the Swedish representative's desire to ensure the earliest possible elimination of weapons of mass destruction and we share his view on this point. I have already had an opportunity to explain why the Soviet proposal provides for the elimination of nuclear, chemical and other types of weapons of mass destruction during the second stage. We were at one time prepared to agree to the destruction of these types of weapons at an earlier stage; as you know, the key to the matter is the position of the Western Powers.

We believe that nuclear weapons should not be singled out from other types of weapons of mass destruction but should be eliminated during the same stage. Clearly until nuclear weapons have been destroyed, it is extremely difficult to solve the problem of control over the liquidation of chemical and biological weapons.

The Soviet delegation has thus given preliminary replies to the questions put by the representative of Sweden. These questions, of course, deserve attention. However, I should like to stress the main requirement which must be met if any progress is to be made in solving the disarmament problem. If we are to reach agreement, we must adhere strictly to our main objective and first come to terms on the questions of principle, that is, on the actual disarmament measures to be carried out during the first, second and third stages. If we succeed in doing this, we shall have no difficulty in reaching agreement on other questions arising out of these questions of principle.

The Soviet delegation therefore believes that we must try to consider here and now whether and to what extent we can reach substantive agreement on the nature of the basic disarmament measures in the first and subsequent stages. This is the only correct procedure, which we must adopt unless we want to turn the Committee into a body perpetually engaged in the discussion of points of detail but achieving nothing.

These are the views I felt compelled to express today. In order to avoid prolonging the discussion and to give the Italian representative an opportunity to use the remaining twenty minutes for a reply if he wishes to do so, I shall not deal with the other matters brought up today by the representatives of the United States and Italy. I shall reserve my answer on these matters until our next meeting.

Mr. STELLE (United States of America): In one of the points which the representative of India made today, and in the question he addressed to the United States delegation, he dealt with the maintenance of the pattern or composition of forces. This question is so closely related to one posed by the representative of Sweden, namely, his second question, on how the United States delegation interpreted "balance", that if the representative of India will not take it amiss I would prefer to defer our response to his question and to take account of his statements in the replies which we hope to make very soon to the questions posed by Mr. Edberg.

I might just say that in our replies to the questions of the representative of Sweden we shall not, in response to Mr. Zorin's mention in his remarks today of Suez, Lebanon and the U.2 aircraft, make any mention of such names as Korea or Hungary. We do not believe that this approach to our work -- and I must say in all frankness that Mr. Zorin's remarks evidenced very little of this kind of approach -- is a useful one, and we do not intend to adopt it.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its thirty-sixth meeting at the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Burns, the representative of Canada.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Italy, the United States, the United Kingdom, India, the Soviet Union, Brazil, Romania, Bulgaria, Canada and Sweden.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 15 May 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.